

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

IN RE: HQ SUSTAINABLE MARITIME
INDUS., INC., DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

This Document Relates to: All Cases

Lead Case No. C11-910 RSL

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
Thursday, Sep. 19, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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1 Plaintiffs Alan Hopkins, Gene Niksich, Farida Corkery-Smith, and Cem Karsan
 2 (collectively, "Plaintiffs")¹ hereby move unopposed for final approval of the proposed Settlement
 3 (filed at Dkt. 74-1). On June 20, 2013, this Court granted preliminary approval of the
 4 Settlement. (Dkt. 83.) This Motion seeks entry of a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal,
 5 submitted herewith, granting final approval of the Settlement. The Settlement resolves the
 6 derivative claims pending in this Court, as well as those currently pending in the Superior Court
 7 of the State of Washington, King County (collectively the "Derivative Actions").² Plaintiffs
 8 submit that the Settlement provides an excellent result for HQSM shareholders and easily
 9 satisfies the "fair, adequate, and reasonable" standard for final approval.

10 The Settlement is the result of substantial effort, vigorous advocacy, and months of hard-
 11 fought, arm's-length, mediator-guided negotiations conducted by skilled and experienced
 12 counsel. See Declaration of Brett D. Stecker, Louis Boyarsky and Michael J. Hynes in Support
 13 of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of
 14 Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses ("Joint Decl." or "Joint Declaration") ¶¶ 37-38.
 15 As a result of the filing and prosecution of the Derivative Actions, as well as the Securities
 16 Action, HQSM's insurer has agreed to pay \$2.75 million to HQSM shareholders, a meaningful
 17 and substantial benefit for HQSM shareholders. Moreover, had there not been the prosecution of
 18 the Derivative Actions it is likely that the settlement fund created would have been less than
 19 \$2.75 million. Though the \$2.75 million has already been received by HQSM, and HQSM used
 20 those funds to pay the settlement of the related Securities Action claims, those funds would have
 21 never been received by HQSM had the present Settlement not been reached, extinguishing the
 22

23 ¹ Unless otherwise defined herein, this motion adopts the definitions of all capitalized
 24 terms as provided in the Stipulation of Settlement dated May 6, 2013 (the "Stipulation").

25 ² The Actions are linked by common factual allegations to a related securities class action,
 26 *Moomjy v. HQ Sustainable Maritime Industries, Inc.*, 2:11-cv-00726-RSL (the "Securities
 27 Action"). The Court issued an Order and Final Judgment that approved settlement of the
 Securities Action on March 21, 2013.

1 shareholder derivative claims brought on HQSM's behalf against its current and former officers
 2 and directors. Indeed, Defendants readily acknowledge that it was the litigation of the Derivative
 3 Actions which provided the "[i]mpetus for a [g]lobal [r]esolution" and "contributed materially to
 4 the timing and terms of the settlement of the [securities action]." (Individual Defs.' Submission
 5 in Resp. to Order to Show Cause Relating to Approval of Proposed Settlement (Dkt. 78 at 3-4).)
 6 The parties' mediator, Jed Melnick (the "Mediator"), a highly respected mediator with extensive
 7 experience in the mediation of complex shareholder derivative actions acknowledged the same,
 8 stating that, as a result of this Court's partial denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss,
 9 Defendants faced serious litigation risk. (Dkt. 81 at 3.) Indeed, by comparison, Defendants
 10 faced more pressure in the Derivative Actions than the Securities Action since a motion to
 11 dismiss in the Securities Action was never fully briefed before settlement. As a result, the
 12 Mediator also acknowledged that the global resolution of the Securities Action and the
 13 Derivative Actions was a substantial factor in persuading Defendant's insurance carriers to
 14 contribute to the settlement. Similarly, North River Insurance Company, one of two insurers
 15 funding the settlement opined that it contributed funds to the monetary settlement "in significant
 16 part due to developments in the Derivative Actions." *See* Notice of Filing Aff. Of Margaret M.
 17 Sutton Regarding Order to Show Cause (Dkt. 79 at 5). Thus, had it not been for the Derivative
 18 Actions it is likely the Settlement would have been smaller.

19 The Settlement is an outstanding resolution of this complex high-risk litigation and
 20 Plaintiffs have conferred substantial benefits upon HQSM and its shareholders. HQSM received
 21 the benefit of \$2.75 million and the release of all securities class claims against it, in significant
 22 part due to the filing, prosecution, and settlement of the Derivative Actions. Accordingly,
 23 Plaintiffs' counsel recommends—based on their substantial experience in shareholder derivative
 24 litigation and informed by their extensive investigation, rigorous evaluation of the strengths and
 25 weaknesses of the claims and defenses, and comparison of the relative value of the Settlement
 26 and the risks and rewards of continued litigation—that the Court approve the Settlement. *See*
 27

Joint Decl., ¶¶ 25, 39-42. The substantial benefits achieved through the Settlement fully justify this Court's final approval of the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

For brevity, Plaintiffs refer the Court to the Joint Declaration for a detailed description of the procedural history of the Derivative Actions and settlement negotiations. Joint Decl., ¶¶ 5-24; *see also* Stipulation of Settlement, Section I (Dkt. 74-1).

II. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL

A. The Standards for Approval of Shareholder Derivative Settlements

"There is a strong policy favoring compromises that resolve litigation, and case law in the Ninth Circuit reflects that strong policy." *In re NVIDIA Corp. Derivative Litig.*, No. 06-6110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117351, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (citations omitted); *MWS Wire Indus., Inc. v. Cal. Fine Wire Co.*, 797 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing an "overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Settlements of shareholder derivative actions are particularly favored because such litigation "is notoriously difficult and unpredictable." *Cohn v. Nelson*, 375 F. Supp. 2d 844, 852 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Court must determine whether the proposed settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable" when reviewing a proposed settlement under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of S.F.*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit considers several factors in evaluating the fairness of the settlement, including: (i) the benefits conferred on the corporation; (ii) the risks of establishing liability and continued litigation; (iii) whether the settlement was a product of fraud or collusion; and (iv) the experience and views of counsel. *See Pac. Enters.*, 47 F.3d at 377-79; *NVIDIA*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117351, at *8-12 (considering benefits to corporation, whether settlement

1 was product of fraud or collusion, risks of continued litigation, and counsel's belief that
2 settlement was in best interest of company and its shareholders).

3 A strong initial presumption of fairness applies to proposed settlements reached by
4 experienced counsel after arm's-length negotiations. *Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.*, No. 98-1646,
5 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, at *20-21 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) (Coughenour, J.) (great
6 weight accorded to recommendations of experienced counsel most closely acquainted with
7 facts). Accordingly:

8 [T]he settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for
9 trial on the merits. Neither the trial court nor this court is to reach any ultimate
10 conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of
11 the dispute, for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of
12 wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The
13 proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative
14 measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.

15 *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625 (citations omitted). In approving a settlement, "the court's
16 intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties
17 to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
18 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating
19 parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all
20 concerned." *Id.* The arduous process by which the Settlement was reached makes clear that the
21 negotiations were at arm's-length and devoid of fraud or collusion.

22 **B. The Settlement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable**

23 As a result of protracted arm's-length settlement negotiations between the Parties and
24 with the substantial assistance of the Mediator, the Parties have agreed to a resolution of the
25 Derivative Actions that all Parties agree provides substantial benefits to HQSM and its
26 shareholders. *See* Stipulation at II, III (Dkt. 74-1). As discussed above, a global settlement of
27 the Derivative Actions and the related Securities Action was an important consideration to the
Defendants and their insurance carriers in obtaining the insurance carriers' contribution of \$2.75

1 million payment. *See In re Oracle Sec. Litig.*, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (A
 2 substantial benefit was created by the derivative action where the derivative suit was a causal
 3 factor in Arthur Andersen’s decision to contribute \$1.75 million to the class settlement. Because
 4 Oracle would otherwise have had to pay an additional \$1.75 million to settle the consolidated
 5 class action on the same terms, Arthur Andersen’s contribution is a “substantial benefit” to
 6 Oracle.).

7 Moreover, the separate payment by the insurers of the fee award was a key part of the
 8 negotiations to ensure credit for the value the Derivative Actions contributed to the global
 9 settlement of the Securities Action and Derivative Actions, without further diminishing any
 10 payment to the Company’s shareholders or causing the Company itself to make payment. Given
 11 the Court’s denial in part of Defendants’ motions to dismiss in the federal Derivative Actions,
 12 the pendency of the Washington State Derivative Action, the pendency of the Washington State
 13 Derivative Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of the stay order, and the
 14 pendency of the Delaware State Derivative Action, Defendants faced serious risk in defending
 15 the Derivative Actions, especially considering that they were in different jurisdictions.
 16 Defendants sought to resolve all these Actions, as well as the Securities Action, together as part
 17 of a single global settlement of all claims and the settlement of the Derivative Actions
 18 substantially contributed to the \$2.75 million to be paid by the insurers to HQSM.³

19 In determining whether to approve the settlement of a shareholder derivative action,
 20 “[t]he principal factor to consider ... is the benefit to [the company] as compared to the risks
 21 posed by derivative litigation.” *In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litig.*, No. 06-4128, 2008
 22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108195, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (citation omitted). As stated by
 23 (i) Defendants, (ii) Defendants’ insurance carrier, and (iii) the Mediator, the pendency of the

24 ³ That this Derivative Settlement is being presented to the Court after the Securities Action
 25 settlement should not cause the Court concern. While the ideal situation would have been to
 26 present a simultaneous settlement, logistical circumstances—including the need to coordinate
 27 with counsel for a later filed Delaware Action—resulted in the Securities Action settlement
 being finalized before the Derivative settlement.

1 Derivative Actions was one of the chief motivating factors that brought Defendants to discuss
 2 settlement. The settlement was achieved in significant part due to the developments in the
 3 Derivative Actions. Because the Federal Plaintiffs survived in part the Defendants' motion to
 4 dismiss, and the Washington State Plaintiffs appealed the Court's stay of discovery pursuant to
 5 SLUSA, the Actions posed substantial risks to defendants and were important factors in
 6 achieving a substantial benefit for HQSM and its shareholders.

7 The determination of a "reasonable" settlement is not susceptible to a mathematical
 8 equation yielding a particularized sum. Rather, "in any case there is a range of reasonableness
 9 with respect to a settlement." *Newman v. Stein*, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1972). Courts in the
 10 Ninth Circuit have "long deferred to the private consensual decision of the parties" in evaluating
 11 the adequacy of a settlement amount. *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir.
 12 2009) (citation omitted). In fact, the Court of Appeals has cautioned that evaluation of the
 13 settlement amount should be "limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that
 14 the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the
 15 negotiating parties," and that the settlement as a whole is fair, reasonable and adequate. *Hanlon*
 16 *v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at
 17 625). A proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only "a fraction of the
 18 potential recovery" that might be available to the class members at trial. *See In re Mego Fin.*
 19 *Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000).

20 Here, the \$2.75 million settlement confers an immediate and valuable cash benefit to
 21 HQSM and its eligible shareholders. Given the complexities of this litigation, the dwindling
 22 assets available to satisfy a judgment, and the continued risks and expense if the Parties were to
 23 proceed through the completion of discovery, trial, and appeals, the Settlement represents a fair,
 24 adequate, and reasonable resolution of the litigation, including the Derivative Actions.

C. The Settlement Appropriately Balances the Risks and Benefits of Continued Litigation

In assessing the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a settlement, a court should balance the benefits of the settlement against the continuing risks of litigation. *See NVIDIA*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117351, at *11; *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (“the very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes’”) (citations omitted). There is no question that derivative actions are complex and fraught with great risk. *See Cohn*, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (“Settlements of shareholder derivative actions are particularly favored because such litigation ‘is notoriously difficult and unpredictable.’”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in affirming a district court’s approval of a derivative settlement, aptly noted that “the odds of winning [a] derivative lawsuit [are] extremely small” because “derivative lawsuits are rarely successful.” *Pac. Enters.*, 47 F.3d at 378 (citation omitted). This case was no different.

While Plaintiffs believe their claims have merit, there is a significant risk that they would recover nothing. Even though Plaintiffs prevailed in part at the motion-to-dismiss stage, they faced considerable challenges establishing liability on their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. *In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (claim that directors are liable for oversight failures is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”); *In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.*, 780 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“daunting legal standard” for failure-of-oversight claims). This is particularly true here where the Defendants are located in China and conducting depositions and detailed discovery is dependent not only on enormous expense but the vagaries of foreign law impeding access to information.

Plaintiffs would also have had to overcome the protections afforded to Defendants under the business judgment rule, which establishes a strong presumption that directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief that actions were in the best interests of the corporation. *In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.*, 907 A.2d 693, 746-47 (Del. Ch. 2005),

1 *aff'd*, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The difficulties posed by stringent legal standards increased the
 2 risk of establishing liability in the Derivative Actions and confirm that the Settlement is a
 3 favorable result.

4 Even a meritorious case can still be lost at trial, *see, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec.*
 5 *Litig.*, No. 02-1486, 2007 WL 4788556 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (after a lengthy trial, jury
 6 returned a verdict against plaintiffs and the action was dismissed); and even success at trial does
 7 not eliminate the risk. For example, in *In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation*, No. 84-
 8 20148, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15608 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1991), a case litigated and tried in this
 9 Circuit, the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs after years of litigation and an extended trial.
 10 Based upon the jury's findings, recoverable damages would have exceeded \$100 million.
 11 However, the district court overturned the verdict, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict
 12 for the individual defendants, and ordered a new trial with respect to the corporate defendant. As
 13 another example, a class won a jury verdict and a motion for j.n.o.v. was denied, but on appeal
 14 the judgment was reversed and the case dismissed. *Backman v. Polaroid Corp.*, 910 F.2d 10 (1st
 15 Cir. 1990).

16 In summary, the risks posed by continued litigation were substantial, and they would be
 17 present at every step of the litigation if it were to continue. *See In re Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. Premium*
 18 *Litig.*, MDL No. 1109, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23217, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1998) ("even if
 19 it is assumed that a successful outcome for plaintiffs at summary judgment or at trial would yield
 20 a greater recovery than the Settlement—which is not at all apparent—there is easily enough
 21 uncertainty in the mix to support settling the dispute rather than risking no recovery in future
 22 proceedings") (citation omitted). Given the obstacles and uncertainties inherent in this complex
 23 derivative litigation, the Settlement guarantees immediate, substantial, and lasting benefits and is
 24 unquestionably superior to the very real risk that HQSM might recover nothing after years of
 25 costly litigation. *See Apple*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108195, at *11 (settlement reasonable in
 26 light of substantial risks).

Based upon the record and applicable law, there were serious risks in overcoming potential defenses and in establishing liability. Even if liability were established, the determination of the amount of recoverable damages would still have posed significant issues and would have been subject to further litigation. Thus, the Settlement guarantees an excellent result with HQSM receiving over \$2.75 million in financial benefits as opposed to continued expensive and uncertain litigation. Accordingly, the Settlement should be approved.

D. The Settlement Is the Product of Arm's-Length, Mediator-Guided Negotiations Conducted by Experienced Counsel

“A presumption of correctness is said to attach to a class settlement reached in arms-length negotiations between experienced capable counsel[.]” *Hughes*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, at *20 (Coughenour, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 227 F.R.D. 553, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (Rothstein, J.) (approving settlement “entered into in good faith, following arms-length and non-collusive negotiations.”). Here, the Settlement is the product of months of arm's-length negotiations conducted by skilled and experienced counsel and supervised by a well-respected mediator. *See* Declaration of Jed Melnick, ¶¶ 3-8 (Dkt. 81).

The extensive settlement negotiations involved a rigorous evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses of the Parties' positions. *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶ 29-36. Plaintiffs' negotiation position was informed by careful analysis of the applicable law and a thorough evaluation of public documents and investigation materials. *Id.* At the time the Parties agreed to settle the Derivative Actions, Defendants' motion to dismiss had been partially denied and the Parties had engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. Before the commencement of the Derivative Actions, Plaintiffs also conducted extensive investigations of the allegations asserted, which continued after the filing of the Derivative Actions. Plaintiffs' significant evaluation and investigative efforts provided sufficient information to allow counsel to make an informed decision about the relative merits of each side's case and to confirm that the Settlement

1 is in the best interests of HQSM and its shareholders.

2 **E. The Recommendation of Experienced Counsel Favors Approval**

3 Experienced counsel, negotiating at arm's-length, have weighed the factors discussed
 4 above and endorse the Settlement. *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶ 39-42. The views of the attorneys actively
 5 conducting the litigation, while not conclusive, are "accorded considerable weight." *Hughes*,
 6 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, at *21; *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 626 (internal quotation
 7 marks and citation omitted) (same); *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility*, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D.
 8 Cal. 1980) (citation omitted) (same); *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043
 9 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("The recommendations of plaintiffs' counsel should be given a presumption of
 10 reasonableness.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts give considerable
 11 weight to the opinions of counsel because counsel are "most closely acquainted with the facts of
 12 the underlying litigation." *In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, No. 02-ML-1475, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
 13 13555, at *32 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *see also*
 14 *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, No. 06-4068, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
 15 26, 2007), *aff'd*, 331 F. App'x 452 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, "the trial judge, absent fraud,
 16 collusion, or the like, should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of counsel."
 17 *Heritage Bond*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555, at *33 (internal quotation marks and citations
 18 omitted); *Pac. Enters.*, 47 F.3d at 378 ("Parties represented by competent counsel are better
 19 positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party's expected outcome
 20 in litigation.").

21 The Derivative Actions have been litigated and settled by experienced and competent
 22 counsel on both sides of the case. *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶ 48-49. Plaintiffs' counsel are experienced
 23 and well-known for their effectiveness in litigating and resolving complex shareholder actions.
 24 *Id.* Defendants were represented by skilled and experienced counsel in making the determination
 25 the Settlement is "in the best interests of HQSM and [its] Shareholders." *See* Stipulation §III
 26
 27

(Dkt. 74-1). The fact that qualified and well-informed counsel endorse the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable weighs in favor of approval. *See* Joint Decl., ¶¶ 48-49.

The assistance of a neutral and well-respected mediator, Mr. Melnick, also assured a sound result for HQSM and its shareholders. *In re AOL Time Warner S'holder Derivative Litig.*, No. 02-6302, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124372, at *74 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009) (“a court-appointed mediator’s involvement in settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure”) (quoting *Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co.*, 907 F.2d 1295, 1323 (2d Cir. 1990)). Mr. Melnick is a respected mediator in complex litigation, including securities class actions and shareholder derivative actions. Melnick Decl., ¶ 2 (Dkt. 81). Mr. Melnick, with the full involvement of the Parties’ counsel, rigorously oversaw the integrity of the settlement process by which the Parties negotiated the settlement and the fee award. Melnick Decl., ¶¶ 4-8. Accordingly, the Court should grant final approval.

III. THE REACTION OF HQSM SHAREHOLDERS SUPPORTS FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

Another factor courts consider when determining whether to approve a settlement in the class-action context is the reaction of the class. *See Mego Fin.*, 213 F.3d at 459. “[T]he reaction of the class to the proffered settlement ... is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.” *In re Rambus Inc. Derivative Litig.*, No. 06-3513, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131845, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Notice which was disseminated to HQSM shareholders in accordance with the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order, advised HQSM shareholders that objections to any of the terms of the Settlement had to be filed with the Court by September 5, 2013. *See* Joint Decl., ¶ 41. Although that date has not yet passed, to date Plaintiffs are not aware of a single objection. *Id.*⁴ Particularly in this age of increased shareholder activism, the fact that there are no objections from any shareholders, including sophisticated institutional investors, supports that the

⁴ If any timely objections are received, Plaintiffs will address them in a reply brief.

1 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and should be finally approved.

2 **IV. CONCLUSION**

3 For the reasons stated above, the Settlement should be granted final approval.

4
5 Dated: August 22, 2013

Respectively submitted,

6 s/ Cliff Cantor

7 By: Cliff Cantor, WSBA # 17893

LAW OFFICES OF CLIFFORD A. CANTOR, P.C.

8 627 208th Ave. SE

9 Sammamish, WA 98704-7033

Tel: (425) 868-7813

10 Fax: (425) 732-3752

Email: cliff.cantor@outlook.com

11 *Liaison counsel for plaintiffs*

12
13 GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP

14 Lionel Z. Glancy

15 Robert V. Prongay

Louis Boyarsky

16 1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 311

Los Angeles, CA 90067

17 Tel: (310) 201-9150

18 Fax: (310) 201-9160

19 THE WEISER LAW FIRM, P.C.

Robert B. Weiser

20 Brett D. Stecker

Jeffrey J. Ciarlanto

21 Joseph M. Profy

121 N. Wayne Ave., Suite 100

Wayne, PA 19087

22 Tel: (610) 225-2677

23 Fax: (610) 225-2678

24 -and-

25 THE WEISER LAW FIRM, P.C.

Kathleen A. Herkenhoff

12707 High Bluff Dr., Suite 200

26 San Diego, CA 92130

Tel: (858) 794-1441
Fax: (858) 794-1450

FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
Beth A. Keller
369 Lexington Ave., 10th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212) 983-9330
Fax: (212) 983-9331

-and-

FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
Michael Hynes
101 Greenwood Ave., Suite 600
Jenkintown, PA 19046
Tel: (215) 277-5770
Fax: (215) 277-5771

Co-lead counsel for Plaintiffs

Certificate of Service

I certify that, on the date stamped above, I caused the foregoing, together with a proposed order, to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF system, which will cause notice of filing to be emailed to counsel of record for all parties.

s/ Cliff Cantor, WSBA # 17893